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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the development of the hierarchical, dynami-
cally reconf igurable, input/output network which has been constructed
at the Draper Laboratory. It presents a summary of the design pro-
cedures used in determining the network architecture, communication
methods, message formats, and overall topology. Further, it describes
both the hardware and software features that have been implemented in
the network's microprocessor-based nodes. In addition, the centrally
located software algorithms developed to configure, repair, and monitor
the network have been extensively discussed. Finally, the thesis also
includes a reliability analysis of the network in a typical application,
and a performance evaluation of the effectiveness of the configuration
and control programs.
The implementation of a hierarchical, dynamically reconf igurable
network is a radical departure from the typical data bus oriented I/O
systems found in many applications today. The justification for this
departure lies in the improved damage - and fault-tolerant features,
not found in other architectures, that the network possesses. Specifi-
cally, through the alternate path redundancy provided by the inactive
links, the centralized controlling element is capable of dynamically
reconfiguring the surviving portions of a damaged network in order to
circumvent the malfunctioning elements. Thus, the overall reliability
of the I/O system has been improved, since it is now possible to main-
tain communication with each peripheral node and its host processor, in
spite of the occurrence of moderate levels of physical damage.

Two variations of the basic network design have been developed.
One, termed the single level network, is the standard form of the I/O
net used in conjunction with the Laboratory's OSIRIS (Onboard Surviva-
ble Integrated Redundant Information System) demonstration implementa-
tion of a commercial aircraft flight control system. All nodes in the
single level network are on the same hierarchical level and consequently
communicate in an identical manner with the central computer. The
second variation of the basic design is called the bilevel network. In
this case, two separate hierarchical levels exist independently, joined
at only one point of tangency, the bilevel node. The advantage of the
bilevel network over the single level network arises in applications
where the computational load is great at the various local processors.
Since the bilevel network is able to effectively isolate the computa-
tionally intensive nodes in a lower level network, not in direct com-
munication with the central processing element, an increased processor
throughput is potentially possible.
To date, experimentation with a six-node single level network
has indicated that the percentage of the available I/O bandwidth re-
quired for network management functions is compatible with the operation
of the digital autopilot application program. Additionally, the average
time required to detect a fault, load the software reconfiguration task,
and correct the indicated malfunction, given the characteristics of the
hardware currently implemented, is on the order of 1 sec. Finally, the
software overhead in the central computer for the network control
programs has amounted to less than one thousand sixteen bit words, plus
an added three hundred words for system tables and constants. Overall,
the hierarchical, dynamically reconf igurable I/O network, is conceptual-
ly well suited to the broad range of applications requiring a high
availability input/output system.
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The potential role of distributed processing has become increas-
ingly important in the real time control and data management environ-
ments of many commercial, industrial, and military systems. Because
of the declining costs of hardware, the placement of a significant
amount of computational capability at a remote location has become
feasible. However, the inherent physical separations, and prolifera-
tion of additional sub-systems resulting from such a distribution, have
resulted in a dramatic increase in the volume of input/output (I/O)
communications required. Clearly, it is essential that this added
communications load must be made as reliable as possible in order to
satisfy the stringent performance requirements imposed by most high-
availability systems [24].
To achieve highly reliable inter-device communications, some
type of fault-and damage-tolerant implementation is normally needed.
Taking the form of redundant hardware, alternate communication paths,
or error recovery procedures, for example, these features provide a
distributed I/O communications system with the capability for "graceful
degradation" [3] [16]. In other words, the system can continue to
operate correctly, even in the presence of a predetermined threshold
of hardware or software faults, or after incurring moderate levels of
physical damage. Many such I/O systems exhibiting a wide range of
fault-tolerant capabilities have been built during the past several
years [24]. This thesis will trace the development of one such imple-
mentation for a commercial aircraft flight control system that has been
constructed at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory.
Since the late 1960 's, the Draper Laboratory has been investi-
gating the application of fault-tolerant multiprocessing technology to
a variety of digital control applications, primarily to the area of
aircraft flight control systems [16] [25] [29] . Out of this continuing
investigation has emerged the OSIRIS (Onboard Survivable Integrated
11

Redundant Information System) concept. OSIRIS is a real-time distribu-
ted processing system consisting of one or more fault-tolerant multi-
processors, a damage-and fault-tolerant network, physically separated
local processors, and operational software for fault detection, identi-
fication, and recovery [15] (see Figure 1.1). An experimental version
of OSIRIS is presently in existence, and it is the OSIRIS input/output
network which is to be studied in this thesis.
The OSIRIS fault-and damage-tolerant network, first envisioned
in 1973 [29] , was originally implemented in 1974 as a six-node simplex
network of hardwired circuit switches under central software control
[25] . This demonstration was evaluated under an Office of Naval Re-
search contract to investigate the possible application of the network
approach to shipboard data management systems. Soon after this origi-
nal effort had been successfully completed, the rapid rise of low cost
microprocessors signalled that a more flexible follow-on implementation
could be realized by centering the design of the network node around a
microprocessor. Consequently, work was initiated in early 1975 to in-
corporate the microprocessor into the demonstration network. At the
same time, it was decided to utilize as the central processing center
for the network the CARDS multiprocessor, another C.S. Draper research
effort. With this decision the "breadboard" OSIRIS system had begun to
take shape. The central processing center, or CPC, possessed an exten-
sive assortment of fault-and damage-tolerant features. It was able to
execute, simultaneously, multiple tasks in addition to the software re-
quired for the I/O network configuration and control. Some of the more
significant features of the CARDS multiprocessor are as listed below:
1. triply modular redundant processors
2. triply modular redundant memories
3. triply modular redundant I/O modules
4
.
triply redundant serial I/O bus
5. dual redundant line drivers and receivers
6. additionally, each I/O module contained among other things,
bus isolation gates and error detection and recording cir-
cuitry.
Subsequent to the beginning of work on the network of micropro-
cessor nodes, a follow-on to the previously cited Office of Naval Re-
search contract was received. The objective of these additional funds
was to demonstrate a concept, proposed earlier in reference [26] , known
as a "bilevel network". This concept evolved as an attempt to more
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Figure 1-1 Block Diagram of Demonstration OSIRIS System,
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network architecture [26]. In a bilevel network, certain specialized
nodes, known as "bilevel nodes", would allow two distinct smaller net-
works to exist independently, joined only at a single point of tangency,
the bilevel node. If the two networks were hierarchically related (i.e.
one of them subordinate to the other) then the bilevel network could
effect a clear division of the network control versus computational
responsibilities. This characteristic, potentially, could result in a
significant improvement in local processing throughput, when compared
to the results obtainable from the simple or single level network
already in development. Through fairly modest additions to the hard-
ware for the microprocessor node, it was determined that a bilevel
node could also be constructed.
Thus, as this thesis began, work was underway, not only on the
incorporation of the microprocessor into the fault-and damage-tolerant
input/output network of the demonstration OSIRIS system, but on the
preliminary stages of the eventual modification of the single level
network into a bilevel network. It is the objective of this effort
to contribute to both of these research goals stated above, in the
following manner:
1. To trace the design processes used in both the single and
bilevel networks.
2. To describe the hardware and nodal operating systems that
have been developed by C.S. Draper personnel [28].
3. To develop, implement, and evaluate the software
algorithms needed to control and configure both the single
and bilevel networks.
4. To present some indication of where the current network re-
search effort should proceed next, based on the progress
made to date.
Although the approach to a fault-and damage-tolerant I/O network
as implemented in the OSIRIS system is unique, other existing computer
systems do utilize, to varying degrees, fault-tolerant features in
their inter-communication schemes. Besides the normal error detection
and correction performed on incoming data by most systems, networks
such as the ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) network also
possess a reconfiguration capability [6] . This feature is made pos-
sible through the use of its packet switching node computers known as
IMP's (Interface Message Processors). In the absence of normal traffic,
14

each IMP transmits idle packets on unused lines at half second inter-
vals. The lack of a return packet or incoming traffic indicates a
faulty line and allows the dynamic routing tables at each node to be
updated accordingly. Thus, faulty links are bypassed and previously
spare links are activated automatically [23] . Though not as complex,
CYBERNET, of the Control Data Corporation, also has a fault-detection
and correction capability, but it requires human intervention to acti-
vate the redundant links [17] . Still other telecommunications networks
such as MERIT at the University of Michigan and OCTOPUS at Lawrence Liver-
more Laboratories in California also implement redundant links to pro-
vide alternate communication paths in the event of link or processor
failures [7] . In all the examples given, the need for a highly reliable
intercommunications system is satisfied to a great extent by utilizing
the dual concepts of redundancy and reconfigurability . These two fea-
tures are also found to be dominant in the design of the OSIRIS input/
output network.
In the chapters to follow, the development of both the single
and bilevel networks is examined. Chapter 2 discusses the various
decisions that were made during the preliminary stages of the network
design. Chief among these include:
1. I/O architecture selection
2. Communications method selection
3. Link and data characteristics
4. Topology selection
Chapter 3 expands, in fairly great detail, upon the features of the
single level six-node network. Included in its discussion are the
following topics:
1. General description and capabilities





5. Network configuration and control software
6. Incorporation of network control and configuration software
into the CPC
Chapter 4 repeats an identical development of the bilevel ten-node
15

network. Unfortunately, the complete hardware implementation of the
ten-node network has not yet been completed. Chapter 5 describes the
general problem of evaluating the reliability of a typical OSIRIS I/O
network. It also discusses, assuming a number of apriori conditions,
the increased reliability characteristics that the alternate paths in
the six-node network contribute. Chapter 6 treats the subject of the
performance of the single level network, particularly in the area of the
configuration and control algorithms* evaluation. Finally Chapters 7





FAULT-TOLERANT NETWORK DESIGN ALTERNATIVES
2 . 1 De_s.ign Constraints Imposed by the Airborne Environment
The initial step in the development of any general communications
network is to identify the set of parameters over which the design is




2. System reaction time
3. Network survivability and vulnerability considerations
4. Network efficiency
5. Network user requirements
6. Serial or parallel transmission
7. Circuit-switched or packet-switched procedures




For the OSIRIS input/output network, several of the above design
considerations, when placed in the context of the airborne environment,
form a set of constraints over which the network design must be
optimized. Specifically, the following are the important questions
to be answered during the network design process:
1. Total Cost
How can the desired levels of performance and reliability
be achieved, while still minimizing the total cost, and often
more importantly, the total weight of the system?
17

2. System Reaction Time
Can the functions of network configuration and control be
accomplished in a relatively small percentage of the total I/O
bandwidth? If not, their utilization will interfere with the
primary flight control functions of the overall system, thereby
degrading the system reaction time.
3. Network Survivability and Vulnerability Considerations
What is the desired level of reliability required? How
is it defined? How much tolerance to faults and physical damage




Serial or Parallel Transmission
What method of communication is best suited to the net-
work? How is it implemented? What do the actual data links
look like? Is the communications method chosen compatible with
the I/O bus of the CPC?
5. Circuit-Switched or Packet-Switched Procedures
How does the hierarchical architecture affect the selec-
tion of nodal switching procedures? How does transmission de-
lay affect both methods? Is there an application where both
alternatives could be utilized?
6 Network Control
What types of transmissions should be developed to con-
trol the network? What is necessary to effectively configure a
network, verify its correct operation, and reconfigure it when
a fault is detected?
7 Network Topology
Is there an optimum arrangement of data links for the
network given the geographic locations of the nodes and the
number of I/O ports per node? Over what characteristics is
this optimization process to be conducted? How sensitive is
the network performance to variations in topology?
Answers to this extensive list of important questions will be
presented, not only in subsequent sections of this chapter, but also,
to a varying extent, in all succeeding chapters. Throughout the devel-
opment; however, a greater emphasis will be placed upon achieving the
18

required fault-and damage-tolerant capabilities, rather than upon
minimizing such considerations as total cost, software simplicity, or
the total weight of the linkage mass.
2-2 Selection of the Network Architecture Over Other I/O Alternatives
The decision to utilize a network scheme for the OSIRIS input/
output communications method was based on a careful examination of the
advantages and disadvantages of the various fundamental fault-tolerant
communications architectures. This comparison, as summarized in Table
1, served to differentiate between the three most common structures;
the dedicated or star connection, the redundant bus connection, and the
network connection (see Figure 2.1). Though each alternative possesses
definite strengths and weaknessess, the overriding concern in the OSIRIS
application of providing an uninterrupted data stream to the central
processing center, tended to narrow the spectrum of acceptable I/O
alternatives. Specifically, the communications structure to be selected
must, among other capabilities, be able to continue to function correct-
ly in the presence of moderate levels of physical damage [15] . Addition-
ally, it is desired that the occurance of isolated faults in one node
have a minimal effect on other nodes. In other words, the faults must
be uncorrelated in order that the validity of the data stream not be
degraded [16]. With these restrictions and the comparisons of Table 1
in mind, the network architecture was chosen as the logical choice for
the OSIRIS I/O system.
In essence, the selection of the network structure for the OSIRIS
system was a compromise between the dedicated and redundant bus archi-
tectures. Like the redundant bus, a network has a large linkage mass
resulting from the necessity of providing alternate communication paths.
Yet, like the dedicated connection architecture, it does not require
complete replication in order to achieve routing redundancy [25] . As
an additional consideration, in a hierarchical design the network con-
trol intelligence is centrally located, often in a well-protected,
redundant, highly damage-resistant environment. This is a key feature,
for as long as the central processing element remains functional, the
network as a whole is able to survive in the face of a partial loss of
capability. Through its ability to reconfigure the remaining network
connections, the CPC can isolate the damaged portion of the network and
effectively circumvent it in most cases. Another noteworthy advantage
of the hierarchical structure is found in the one-way initiation of all
communications by the CPC. Since the central processing element is the
top level of control in the system, all data, control, and configuration
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COMPARISON OF MAJOR FAULT-TOLERANT
COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Dedicated Connections (STAR Ne twork
)
Simplest to implement.
Failure of one node does not
"bring-down" entire system (in-




Fewer links and less cable
weight than dedicated
connections.
Has good growth potential.
Less complex than network (mini-
mal operational and reconfigu-
ration software overhead)
.




Greatest tolerance to physical
damage (reconfiguration)
.
Simplifies the implementation of
hierarchical processing systems.
Centrally located network control
Simplifies fault identification.
Difficult to expand once central
computer enclosure has been built.
Requires excessive wire weight
and bulkhead penetrations.
Communication to node lost if
dedicated link fails.
Underutilizes the connection
medium and interface electronics.
More vulnerable to damage than
network
.
Not readily adaptable to point-
to-point fiber optic implementa-
tion (bus coupler design)
.
Susceptible to "multiplier
phenomenon" (single failure dis-
abling a large portion of I/O
system)
Costly in associated node hard-
ware and software overhead.
More bulkhead penetrations and
wire weight than nonredundant
single bus system.





message routing procedures [29]. Stated differently, no provisions
need be made in the communications protocol to allow for node to node
inter-communications, or to provide for transmissions to the CPC initia-
ted by a node. In summary, although the redundant bus and dedicated
connection structures are excellent I/O architectures for many classes
of applications, the requirements put forth by the OSIRIS system dic-
tate the use of a hierarchical network for its I/O scheme. In a related
application, the network approach is also well-suited to a naval ship-
board environment. In this case, many of the same restrictions aimed
at insuring high levels of performance and reliability that apply in
an airborne application, are also critical to the shipboard command
and control function [17].
2. 3 Serial or Parallel Transmission
Three considerations formed the basis for the selection of the
transmission method for the OSIRIS I/O network.
1. Will the method be feasible in a widely distributed connec-
tion scheme involving several nodes and moderately long
links?
2. How does the ease of implementation of the hardware communi-
cations interfaces compare for the two alternatives?
3. Is the method compatible with the internal I/O bus of the
CARDS multiprocessor to which it will be attached?
On the basis of these three concerns, it was decided to use serial
asynchronous transmission throughout the network. Specifically, this
was the only one of the two alternatives which was both easy to imple-
ment, and compatible with the central processing centers I/O bus. In
addition, opting for serial instead of parallel communications
interfaces reduced the total linkage mass requirements by a ratio of
approximately eight to one, a significant savings in cost for any net-
work.
In the breadboard OSIRIS system standard microprocessor
asynchronous interface adapters (ACIA's) were chosen as the hardware
element to be the transmission controllers [26] . The standard RS-232
[18] 60 mA current loop was selected as the basis on which the ACIA's
would transmit a non-return-to-zero (NRZ) type code. Although asyn-
chronous operation does require additional start, stop and parity bits
to be sent with each byte transmitted, the resulting reduction in the
22

effective throughput is not significant in the current implementation.
Still, for any follow-on version of the OSIRIS system, a much greater
I/O bandwidth will be required. This need will be satisfied, most
likely, not by converting to a synchronous communications scheme, but
by operating the ACIA's with faster microprocessors and associated memo-
ries. In this way, the problems involved in a byte synchronous system
of transmitting and interpreting correctly the sync signals, can be
avoided [23]
.
As far as the compatibility of the network transmission method
with the CPC's I/O bus was concerned, the decision to utilize serial
asynchronous transmission was predetermined by the existing bus archi-
tecture. The internal bus of the CARDS multiprocessor is a triply re-
dundant serial I/O bus. To interface it with the network, devices
known as I/O access units (IOA's) have been constructed [16] (see Figure
2.2). The IOA's contain a voting mechanism to convert the triply re-
dundant data of the internal bus into a single majority signal [28]
.
The resulting signal is then routed to an ACIA where the requisite
start, stop, and parity bits are appended before transmission to the
network. The process is reversed for incoming data from a particular
node. A copy of the returning signal is placed on each I/O bus so that
it can be distributed to the applicable ACIA's in the CPC.
In conclusion, the decision to implement serial asynchronous
transmission was made primarily because of the structure of the CPC's
triply redundant I/O bus, the ease of implementation using readily
available ACIA's, and the great savings in wire weight when compared to
that necessary in a parallel system. Furthermore, the I/O bandwidth
required by the OSIRIS flight control system was not high enough to
warrant the added expense of either byte synchronous or parallel
communications
.
2.4 Circuit-Switched or Packet-Switched Procedures
An important determination in the overall design of the OSIRIS
I/O system was whether circuit-switching or packet-switching pro-
cedures should be utilized. The characteristics of both switching
methods are delineated in Table 2. In essence, circuit-switching in-
volves two operations. First, a communications path must be established
between the sender and receiver. Once established, the information
transfer is then allowed to take place. On the other hand, packet



















In this method a message is stored at intermediate nodes
as it makes its way toward its destination. Each time the message is
forwarded correctly, the previous node is freed from any further re-
sponsibility for the message upon receipt of a positive acknowledgement.
Additionally, in a store-and-forward system some sort of routing stra-
tegy is required at the node itself, in order to select the next inter-
mediate node to which the message will be forwarded. In a full scale
packet-switching network, the ARPA net [6] for example, the bandwidth
of the various channels is more effectively utilized since the routing
strategy can be a dynamic function of such parameters as the I/O traf-
fic load [11]
.
Returning to the OSIRIS system, the decision as to which switching
scheme to implement in the microprocessor nodes, as has been done
throughout the design process, was based upon the intended application
environment of the network. For the single-level I/O network, circuit-
switching was selected due to its relative simplicity of implementation,
and its characteristic of negligible transmission delays. This
is attributable to the fact that once a network is configured, it
is essentially a bus structure over which messages are
sent and received, with no intermediate processing by nodes in the
transmission path. For the bilevel network, however, a combination of
circuit-switching and packet-switching was neccessary. This stemmed
from the requirement to be able to communicate between the two levels
of the hierarchy. To send a message from the central processing
center to a node in the lower level of the network, the desired trans-
mission is circuit-switched through the upper level network to a par-
ticular bilevel node. Since the original message is directed specific-
ally to that bilevel node, the node stores the entire message in its
input buffer. Upon interpretation of the message, the bilevel node
decides that data is required from one of the nodes subordinate to
it in the lower level. The bilevel node then reformats the message
and forwards it to the actual destination node. The subsequent re-
turning data is routed back to the CPC in a reverse manner. The bi-
level node handles the packet-switching procedures identically to a
larger scale network's node except for four basic differences:
1. It has no dynamic routing capacity
2. It cannot queue messages










1. Logical equivalent of a wire 1. No direct connection established
circuit connecting the source
and destination.
2. Real time capability, negligi-
ble transmission delay.
3. Messages are not buffered.
4. Hardware switches with minimal
intelligence required.






7. Does not allow for transmission
rate or code conversion.
8. Fixed bandwidth transmission.
9. Explicit messages.
2. Real time capabilities limited
by inherent retransmission delays,
3. Messages are buffered.
4. Hardware switches with moderate
switching computer required.
5. Dynamic routing possible; how-
ever, some packets can become
lost during message routing.
6. Lengthy transmissions are chopped
into short packets.
7. Buffering allows for speed or
code conversion.
8. Variable bandwidth according to
need.
9. Delegation of authority possible.
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4. It transmits and receives packets of only one byte in length.
The implementation of packet-switching procedures in a network
operating in a real-time control environment has one serious drawback.
As stated earlier, this limitation is the inherent transmission delay
associated with the packet-switching process. Since an iterative con-
trol loop program, such as the OSIRIS digital autopilot, cannot function
effectively when significant delay is encountered in the transmission
path, the bilevel network, as currently being designed, may not be
practical due to the placement of the autopilot function solely in the
CPC and the use of packet-switching in the bilevel nodes. Fortunately,
this restriction can be easily eliminated, if the autopilot task is
distributed amongst the bilevel nodes. In this way, each local proces-
sor will be in direct circuit-switched communication with its control-
ling superior, and consequently will not encounter a transmission delay.
2 . 5 Network Control Considerations
To effectively control the operation of the OSIRIS I/O network,
a set of network "commands" consisting of easily implemented, reliable
formats must be established. Through these short message transmissions,
the network configuration and control algorithms residing in the CPC,
and described in Chapter 3 and 4, can carry out the following four
necessary control functions [5]
:
1. Link creation and deletion.
2. Connectivity monitoring.
3. Reconfiguration.
4. Verification of the status of active and spare assets.
The following outlines the network commands currently in use in
the breadboard OSIRIS I/O network [28]
:
1 . GATEMAN Command
The GATEMAN Command is used in control functions (1) and (3)
to set a Particular I/O port to the INBOARD state. An INBOARD
port is a port over which messages may be received from the CPC.
Once received, a message is routed through the node's internal
switching circuitry (described in Section 3.3) and out to other
nodes via any OUTBOARD ports. No message may be routed through
a node unless an INBOARD port has been established on that node.
Only one INBOARD port is allowed per node. Furthermore, the
joining of a particular node to the I/O network is
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signified by its acceptance of an INBOARD port. A GATEMAN com-
mand is three bytes long, two bytes of which are the destination
node ID and its complement. To be interpreted properly by the
nodal operating system, both bit strings must match exactly those
stored in the destination node. This feature decreases the pro-
bability of erroneous message transmissions being able to alter
a port to the INBOARD state.
2. CONTROL Command or RECONFIGURATION Command
The CONTROL command is also used in control functions (1)
and (3) , primarily to set a particular I/O port to the OUTBOARD
or NULL state. An OUTBOARD port, as previously discussed,
serves as the outlet for messages to flow from one node to
another node, while a NULL port allows no message routing to
to be performed by that port. Both commands have similar formats
to the extent that they both are four bytes in length and con-




The RESTART command is a variation of the GATEMAN command
in that it may be received and processed by a node which does
not have an INBOARD port. CONTROL commands, incidentally, are
not processed by a node unless the node has an INBOARD port.
The RESTART command is essential to control functions (1) and
(3). It's objective is set to the NULL state all ports on a part-
icular node, and to reset certain software functions as will be
described in Section 3.4. The real value of the RESTART command
is seen in its use with the RECONFIGURATION function (3). In
that case, if a node is detected as sporadically transmitting
erroneous data over its one or more OUTBOARD ports [i.e. a
"babbling" node [29] ] , the RESTART command can be utilized to
disable this node, if possible, by NULLing all of its I/O ports.
Thus, the effects of the malfunctioning node can be eliminated.
The ability to silence a babbing node with the RESTART command
is a direct benefit also of the implementation of duplex links
throughout the network (refer to Section 3.3).
4. STATUS Request
The STATUS request is a particular type of CONTROL com-
mand used in control functions (1) (2) (3) (4). Its function
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is to interrogate a node as to the state of its I/O ports. The
node's response is then transmitted, after a slight delay, back
to the CPC. If for some reason the node is inoperative or
possibly no longer connected, the CPC will "timeout" while wait-
ing in a loop for the expected response. In this case, an error
condition is signalled. The number and duration of the CPC time-
outs is an important factor in the performance of the various
control and configuration algorithms (refer to Chapter 6 ) . The
STATUS request is used, not only as a connectivity monitoring
tool, but as a means of insuring the successful execution of
the GATEMAN and CONTROL commands during the link creation and
deletion function.
Two other message formats, though not involved with the network
control functions, are nonetheless worthy of note since they
provide the network with a data acquisition capability.
1. DATA message
The purpose of a DATA message is to transfer data between
the CPC and the node application programs. The DATA messages use
the synchronization scheme to be described in Section 3.3. They
can be of any length, and are terminated by a special form of the
last message to be covered, the ACKNOWLEDGEMENT word.
2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Word
The ACKNOWLEDGEMENT word (ACK) is used solely with
DATA messages. It is designed to acknowledge the receipt
of each word of a DATA message, to control the flow of data
(refer again to Section 3.3), and as an "END-OF-MESSAGE" indica-
tor.
2 . 6 Topological Optimization Considerations
Fundamental to the design of any fault-tolerant network is its
ability to sustain a given number of element failures without a serious
loss of performance. This attribute of "graceful degradation" is
dependent, not only upon the reliabilities and availabilities of the
individual system components, but also on the "topology" of the net-
work. Topology here means the connection pattern of nodes and links
given that the geographic locations of the nodes have previously been
determined [6] . When this pattern is optimized with respect to given




The process of topological optimization, while strongly influenced
by the theorems of graph theory, is generally implemented for suf-
ficiently large networks in a heuristic manner. This fact can be seen
by considering the number of distinct topologies requiring evaluation





Evaluating this expression even for a small network, say of six nodes
and ten links results in a number of possible combinations of 151/10! 5!
or 3003. While an analysis is possible for networks up to approximately
25 nodes, the final topology is further complicated by the additional
"real-world" constraints of non-uniform traffic patterns, anomalous
line costs, etc [19]. Consequently, for the OSIRIS I/O network, [since
its final implementation will consist of considerably more nodes than
are present in the breadboard model [16]], a recursive, non-analytical,
evaluation procedure will be used to determine the most acceptable net-
work topology. In essence, the topological optimization will consist
of maximizing the number of node failures sustainable in any portion of
the network before communications are lost, subject to the dual con-
straints of cost (i.e. - number of links and total sum of link lengths)
and transmission delay.
The network topology evaluation will be based on the following
characteristics
:
1. The geographic locations of the nodes will be coincident
with the aircraft sensors and effectors (see Figure 2.3). For
the breadboard implementation, however, no replication of
sensors/effectors will be allowed, nor will replication of
the number of nodes servicing each sensor be evaluated.
Also, since no hypothetical distribution nodes such as given
in Figure 2.3 has been formulated, the six demonstration
nodes will be arranged symmetrically to facilitate the dis-
play and evaluation process.
2. The network must be able to sustain at least two link fail-
ures before any node of the network is isolated from the









































that there must be three or more paths, though not totally
disjoint, between each pair of network nodes, and between
the CPC and each node.
3. Each single level node will have three I/O ports. Each
bilevel node will have six I/O ports. There will be no bi-
level ports included in the initial topological evaluation.
4. Every node will be considered equal in priority (i.e. - all
devices attached to each node are assumed to be equivalent)
.
5. Since no bilevel nodes will be included in the initial eval-
uation, the optimization process over the delay constraint will
be eliminated. This occurs since there is negligible trans-
mission delay in a circuit-switched network.
The topological evaluation procedure for a typical OSIRIS I/O
network now evolves into constructing a minimum cost network given n
geographically positioned nodes, such that a matrix known as the
redundancy matrix R [6] is maximized with respect to a cost measure,
Cm (the sum of the number of links and a weighted sum of the links).
As seen in Figure 2.4, the evaluation cycle is repeated for as many
different topologies as desired. The one with the highest effective-
ness measure, Em, when the process is terminated will be considered
"optimal" in the sense of this evaluation procedure. If two topologies
or more have equal effectiveness measure at the conclusion of the
evaluation process, then a random choice is made from the equivalent
topologies
.
In conclusion, altnough the stated evaluation procedure cannot
be directly applied to an actual OSIRIS I/O network implementation
without a number of broad assumptions, it does provide a simple,
heuristic approach to the problem of selecting a test topology. On a
large scale (i.e. - many nodes in the network), the number of topologies
requiring evaluation before a decision could be determined would prove
to be computationally unmanageable without the application of a computer
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SINGLE LEVEL SIX-NODE NETWORK
3. 1 General Description and Capabilities
The six-node single level network is a damage-and fault-tolerant
network implemented in the Advanced Digital Systems Laboratory of the
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. It consists of six Motorola M6800
microprocessor-based nodes, ten full duplex links terminated with
differential line drivers and optical isolators, a display keyboard
(DSKY) interface, a teletype interface, and an A/D and D/A interface
(see Figure 3.1). The network is connected to the CARDS multiprocessor
complex which functions as the central processing center (CPC) , and
superior "node" of the network. The primary function of the network,
currently, is to serve as the I/O interface joining the CPC to a Boeing
70 7 flight simulator. The CPC executes an autopilot function, genera-
ting flight control signals based on simulated aircraft data generated
by the Hybrid Simulation Facility (refer again to Figure 1.1).
The primary capabilities of the six-node network are listed as
follows
:
1. Maximum bandwidth of any link - 31.25 kHz.
2. Message format - circuit- switched packets of 11 bits (8 data
bits, start bit, stop bit, parity bit) fRS-232 standard .
3. Hierarchical command structure - no initiation of commands
from nodes, and no communication allowed between two nodes.
4
.
Connectivity - three I/O ports per node
.
5 Fault-tolerance level - network can withstand at least two
link failures anywhere (except for the two links from the
CPC) and continue to function as a fully connected network.
6. Communications method - asynchronous bit serial.






8. Error control - parity, framing, and receiver overrun
checked on each byte. Error recovery initiated after
receipt of one of above transmission errors, initiated by
the CPC only.
9. Network control - software, located in the CPC's main
memory, controls growth, reconfiguration and testing of the
ne twork
.
10. Display - a Digital Equipment Corporation "DECSCOPE" shows
the status of network at all times and allows for the
interactive network monitoring program "SYSPROG" to be
executed.
11. Modularity - each node is identical and can be placed in
any node position, (i.e. this is because the node ID is
"hard-wired" into the backplane of each node's slot.)
An expanded description of many of the listed network features
will be presented in succeeding sections of this chapter.
3. 2 Test Network Topology Selection
The topology of the six- node network was chosen on the basis of
the topological optimization process as described in Section 2.6 for
a network of six symmetrically positioned nodes. It was also selected
so that it could be displayed clearly on the DECSCOPE, thus enhancing
the demonstrateability of the single level network's features. The
result is seen in Figure 3.2, a photograph of the actual DECSCOPE I/O
network display. Few of the 3003 possible network combinations, as
were calculated in Section 2.6, were actually evaluated, since many of
the combinations were either equivalent, or else not applicable.
For example, the cases of more than one link between a
single pair of nodes were disregarded. For a selected topology, the
redundancy matrix was calculated by determining the set of possible
paths joining any two nodes. It should be noted that in the form of
the matrix computed here, many paths contained one or more common links.
Therefore, the failure of a particular link may reduce the redundancy
matrix entry for a particular node pair by more than one. However, the
redundancy matrix is still a valid interpretation of the level of fault-
tolerance of the network due to the manner in which the network is
actually reconfigured after a failure. It is also an interpretation
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Figure 3.2 Single Level Six-Node Topology,
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to be used in the discussion of the reliability test configurations
(refer to Section 5.3).
Highlights of the optimization calculations used to evaluate the
topology that was finally selected are as follows: (refer to Figure 2.4
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Although the actual value of 5.83 for the effectiveness measure
has no significance by itself, it did prove to be the highest value
calculated for the networks tested. Also, as implied by the redundancy
matrix, the fault -tolerance level of two link failures was met by this
topology. In summary, the test topology of Figure 3.2 was chosen since
it best satisfied the topological evaluation procedure by maximizing
the redundancy of the network, while minimizing its cost of implementa-
tion.
3 . 3 Node Hardware Description
The M6800 microprocessor node is an efficiently designed digital
system which is contained entirely on one plug-in circuit board. Its
compact implementation is thus ideally suited to use aboard an aircraft
or a ship. The node requires two power supplies for its TTL and MOS
elements: +5 and -12 volts. It is partitioned into a control and data
portion, in keeping with the current digital design philosophy.
Since the control section's finite state machine (FSM) is imple-
mented primarily in software, its discussion will be deferred to
Section 3.4 on the nodal operating system. From a strictly component
sense, however, the control portion of the node's implementation is
comprised of the M6800 microprocessor unit (MPU) , 4 - National Semi-
conductor MM5204Q 512x8 bit programmable read only memories, two M6810
128x8 bit random access memories, miscellaneous TTL gates, etc.,
required to operate the microprocessor properly, and a 4 MHz crystal
oscillator clock (see Figure 3.3). For a detailed description of the
control signals of the M6800 MPU, and the other associated chips
consult reference 26. The execution speed of the control portion of
the node is hardware constrained. Suffice it to say that, although the
M6800 MPU can operate at rates up to 1 MHz, it is currently operated at
500 kHz with the I/O in the divide by 16 mode (31.25 kHz). This is due
to the relatively slow access times of the 5204 MOS PROM's. In an
actual OSIRIS implementation, due to the use of faster microprocessors
and bipolar fusible-link PROM's, the anticipated I/O speeds will be in
the vicinity of 1 M baud.
The data section of the single level node has the important
responsibilities for node I/O, and for circuit-switching the three ports
onto and off of the node's internal bus. The data section also

































































Figure 3.3 M6 800 Microprocessor Node Block Diagram.
41

the nodes. The major components of the data portion are 4 - MC 6850
asynchronous communications interface adapters (ACIA's) , two MC 6 82
peripheral interface adapters (PIA' s) , 3 differential line drivers,
3 optical isolators, and various NAND gates, etc., to serve as the
circuit switches (see Figure 3.4).
As far as the implementation of the data links is concerned,
since the details of communicating data from the central processor to
the network were adequately covered in the last chapter, only the
actual composition of the physical links need be covered in this
paragraph. Each of the ten links is full-duplex, and is implemented
using 2 twisted, shielded wire pairs which are configured as two
current loops (see Figure 3.5) . To reduce noise, the links are
optically isolated and differentially driven. Specifically, at the
transmitting end of a particular half of a link, a differential line
driver generates a differential signal in response to a direct current
"1" or "0" (see Figure 3.5 again). This signal is transmitted in the
current loop to the receiving end of the link. There an optical
isolator is caused to either conduct, or not to conduct in response to
it being either forward or reverse biased, respectively. The current
produced by the optical isolator is then passed to one of the three
ports of a particular node (refer to Figure 3.3 again) for appropriate
message processing.
Once a byte of a message has been received by an ACIA an*IRQ*
interrupt is generated (to be defined in Section 3.4). In response,
the operating system will determine first, if the message is intended
for that particular node's attention, and if so whether any parity,
framing, or receiver overrun error conditions are indicated.
If the message is not for that particular node, it is ignored.
Since the intended path to the destination node was constructed during
the configuration phase in a circuit-switched network, the message will
proceed through the intermediate node, regardless of whether it is
being processed or not. The route of its passage through the node is
determined by the setting of the nodes circuit switches (refer to
Figure 3.4 again). The circuit switches are enabled using
specific bits of one of the two registers, of one of the PIA's found
on the node. The setting of these bits is determined by the MPU, in
response to CPC generated network control commands (refer to Section
2.5). Again, the restriction exists that no more than one I/O port








































Figure 3.5 Data Link Structure
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undesired condition of data looping. As a final comment to
complete the description of the data portion of th node, once a message
has reached its destination, the response, if any, re-traces the same
path, over which it was transmitted, back to the CPC. This is done by
utilizing the other half of each duplex link involved.
3 .4 Nodal Operating System
The operating system for the microprocessor node was designed
and developed, in a large part, by C.J. Smith [28]. Its description
is essential to the understanding of the single level network, and so
a summary of some of the work of Reference 28 will be presented.
The nodal operating system is responsible for many of the
same network functions as is a typical Programmable Front End Processor
(PFEP) in a telecommunications network [22]. Specifically, the opera-
ting system of the M6800 microprocessor node provides for:





Message buffering to a limited extent.
5. Code conversion and reformatting of network messages.
6. Data manipulation.
To implement the above list of capabilities, the operating
system, in its current form, performs the following operations [28]
:
1. Supports the circuit-switching functions.
2. Allows dynamic network reconfiguration.
3. Supports multiple I/O ports and devices.
4. Provides for error detection and error recovery procedures.
5. Utilizes full-duplex transmission links to the maximum
extent possible.
6. Provides a convenient interface for background
application programs.




The major portion of the operating system is divided into four
sections, corresponding to the four types of interrupts recognized by
the M6800 MPU: RESET, non-maskable interrupt (NMI) , software interrupt
(SWI) , and interrupt request (IRQ) . The SWI and NMI sections are
completely independent, while the RESET and IRQ sections are related
during the node initialization process.
Since the major portion of the operating system is the interrupt
request supervisor, with its associated message processing states, it
will be described first. A processing state is used to designate the
process which will be activated upon the occurrence of an IRQ interrupt,
such as those generated by the ACIA of a particular I/O port. Each of
the three ports on a node can be simultaneously sending or receving
data, and so there are six possible transitions for each IRQ interrupt.
When an IRQ interrupt does occur, the interrupt request supervisor polls
the three ports to determine the cause of the interrupt, and therefore
which servicing routine to activate. It also decides if a state change
is required on the next interrupt, and if so, updates its state table
accordingly. The initial state of the operating system is set by either
a RESET interrupt or else by a CPC generated RESTART command. In this
manner, the CPC exercises considerable control over which processes
will be activated at any one time in the node. In the following four
paragraphs, the features of the four interrupt handling routines will
be discussed.
I. RESET and RESTART
The RESET section of the operating system is activated by either
the hardware detection of the RESET line going low, or by the interpre-
tation of a CPC generated message as being a RESTART command. In
either case, the following functions are then executed:
1. All 256 bytes of RAM are cleared.
2. Address pointers for buffer management and I/O port
addressing are initialized.
3. All circuit switches are reset to the NULL state by
reprogramming the PIA to output all zeros for the
the 6 control bits.
4. The initial values for the six state pointers are set.
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5. The unique node identifier (ID) is read from the physical
slot into which the node has been placed. This ID is then
stored in RAM.
6. The I/O port ACIA's are initialized to the following state:
11 bit blocks (8 data bits, 1 start, 1 stop, 1 odd parity
bit), divide by 16 I/O rate, transmit data register empty
(TDRE) interrupt disabled, receive data register (RDRF)
interrupt enabled.
7. If the display keyboard is attached, a branch is made to
the DSKY program.
8. If the teletype interface is connected, the TTY ACIA is
programmed for 2 stop bits, no parity bit, and the divide
by 64 mode.
9. The interrupt mask is cleared and then control is passed
to the background application via a "JSR" instruction.
II. NON-MASKABLE INTERRUPT (NMI)
This section is activated only when the NMI line goes low. The
only hardware unit equipped with an NMI capability is the DSKY. How-
ever, before control is passed to the DSKY NMI entry point, a check is
made to ensure that the DSKY is connected.
III. SOFTWARE INTERRUPT (SWI)
The SWI interrupt is used for debugging purposes only, and is
activated when an SWI instruction is executed by the background job.
If the TTY is attached, its monitor program will be executed, or if the
DSKY is connected, its SWI routine will be branched to. If neither
unit is present, no action will be taken.
IV. INTERRUPT REQUEST (IRQ)
The processing of the IRQ interrupt has been discussed to a
great extent in a previous section, but the following additional
points must be appended. If an I/O port did not cause the interrupt,
the TTY status register is checked to see if the TTY interface is
connected. If so, the contents of the registers are printed, and the
TTY monitor program maintains control. If the DSKY caused the IRQ
interrupt, control is passed to its IRQ entry point, which returns via
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an "RTI" instruction. Finally, if the cause of the interrupt cannot
be determined, an error code is set, and control returns to the back-
ground job.
Another important portion of the operating system is the message
synchronization and error control procedures. As stated before, these
procedures are invoked only during DATA messages, and are not used dur-
ing network control commands. In reference to Figure 3.6, the following
statements concern the form of communications protocol used to imple-
ment the message synchronization.
1. Each 11 bit block is edited by the receiving node's (or
CPC's) ACIA. If no transmission errors are detected, an
acknowledgement (ACK) is transmitted back to the message
originator requesting continuation of the message.
2. Since this protocol is implemented using full-duplex links,
time is not wasted by the sender while waiting for a re-
turning ACK before sending the next block. On the
contrary, up to three words can be transmitted, before the
first ACK must have been received. If none is received,
the transmission is terminated before a fourth word is
sent. In the node, the subsequent receipt of an ACK will
re-initiate transmission, while in the CPC a software
timeout will occur at which time error recovery procedures
will be invoked.
3. CONTROL and GATEMAN message formats (as were previously
mentioned) do not use the message synchronization procedure.
This is because the network control commands are themselves
used in the error recovery process, and consequently, it is
not possible to use them to recover from their own errors.
With the message synchronization process in mind, the error
recovery routine for transmission errors will now be discussed as the
final important aspect of the operating system. Upon detection of an
error, the receiving node will transmit to the sender (CPC) a word
indicating the nature of the error. The sender, in response, formats
and sends a CONTROL message header, followed by a re-transmission of
the incorrectly received data, and then the remainder of the message.
If error recovery is not successful after two attempts in re-estab-















Source Node (or CPC) transmits up to 3 words at start.
ACK for Word 1 must be received before Word 4 is sent;
if received, message is continued.
CONTROL messages are not acknowledged by this method.
Figure 3-6 CPC-NODE Message Synchronization,
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will described in Section 3.6) will be invoked. Finally, the node will
not attempt to re-establish communications on its own, but will wait
for instructions from the CPC . There is no limit to the number of
successful error recoveries during a single message, however, excessive
error recoveries do degrade system throughput and performance.
3 . 5 Network Configuration and Control Software
The set of algorithms grouped together under the heading "con-
figuration and control software" form the major contributions of the
author to the development of the single level network. These programs,
written in IMP-16C assembly language, reside in the main memory and in
the ground support processor of the central processing center (CARDS)
.
They consist of five basic programs, three of which can be executed
as a task in a triad of processors operating in a multiprocessing con-
figuration. A brief description of the programs is as follows:
1. GROW
The program which sets the circuit switches of the various
nodes in such a manner as to construct a funtioning I/O
system. GROW must be called during the initialization
process not only to construct the network, but to initialize
the data base used in programs 2 and 3. GROW constructs
a network, basically, by starting at a root node (the CPC),
and then attempting to activate all possible links subject
to the restriction that a node may not have more than one
port which is INBOARD.
2. RECONFIGURE
A derivative of GROW, called when the network must be
restructured to avoid a known link or node failure.
RECONFIGURE uses the same "growth" type process as 1, but
relies on a data base that has been structured to only
test and enable those links necessary in order to affect
a network repair. It will not disturb those portions of
the network which are performing normally.
3. TEST
A relatively short program used to isolate and identify a
link or node failure. TEST sends a STATUS request to each
node in the net, in the order in which that node was joined
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to the network. In doing this, a failure to receive a
status response back from a test node can isolate a fault
to a single point. TEST also verifies that the status of
each port of the test node matches that found in the data




A program designed to be executed in the ground support
processor of the CPC which continually loops through the
TEST program waiting for a network failure. When a failure
is detected, MONITOR branches to RECONFIGURE for correction.
MONITOR also re-GROW's the network after a user selected
number of TEST loops in order to reconnect failed links
that have become operational since the last time GROW was
called.
5. SYSPROG
An interactive demonstration program running in the ground
support processor which contains programs 1-4 plus appli-
cation subroutines for sending and receiving teletype
messages. SYSPROG' s major benefit, however, is that it
also contains the DECSCOPE network display program and a
time calculation subroutine. In this manner, not only can
data on various network configurations be taken, but the
dynamic reconfiguration process can be observed (refer to
Figures 3.13 - 3 . 1 4) .
GROW, RECONFIGURE, and TEST all run as a task in a lock-step manner in
a triad of processors where the results of every instruction are voted
upon. Thus, the reliability of the network is greater than it would
have been if the configuration and control software had been resident
in the individual nodes' operating systems. Again, as mentioned earlier,
this is one of the more significant advantages of the hierarchical
network design.
Before the network algorithms can be described, three preparatory
topics must be addressed: the organization of the network's data base,
the sizes of the different program segments, and a brief description





The network's data base and associated shared constants are
located exclusively in the CPC's main memory. The major tables and
lists are as follows:
1. PHYSICAL CONNECTION TABLE (CONTAB)
Fifty-five sixteen bit words organized in increasing order
describe the actual physical topology of the network. They
are of the form (NNNN PPPP NNNN PPPP) where the first byte
is the origin's node and port ID which is connected to the
second byte's port and node ID or the destination of that










; port 1 to node , port 1
; port 2 to node 2 , port 3
; port 3 to node 3 , port 3
; future expansion to
; five ports/node.
PORT STATUS TABLE (PORTAB)
Again as in 1, fifty-five sixteen bit words are organized
by node and port in increasing order as in the CONTAB, but
this time each word indicates the current state of each
particular port. The PORTAB is the most important table
of the network's data base for it acts as a "virtual"
network in itself. The table is referenced by all configu-
ration and control programs. PORTAB is initialized by the
GROW program and then updated as the network proceeds
through the growth process. The allowable status table
entries are
:
0000 - null port
0001 - inboard port
0002 - outboard port




Sixteen consecutive sixteen bit words which indicate the
order in which successive nodes accepted an INBOARD port,
and became a member of the network. The GROWLIST is formed
by the GROW routine, and it is an integral part of the test
and reconfiguration data base.
4. RESET LIST
Six consecutive sixteen bit words which indicate the order
in which to prepare a damaged network for reconfiguration.
More explanation of the RESET LIST will given in a later
section.
Providing essential functions for the GROW and RECONFIGURE rou-
tines are the following service subroutines:
1. GATEMAN
Routine which makes the node and port whose ID's are passed
to it in registers one and three, an INBOARD port. GATEMAN
returns to the main program a if successful and a 1
otherwise.
2. CONTROL
Routine which makes the node and port whose ID's are passed
to it in registers one and three, an OUTBOARD port if reg-
ister zero = , or a NULL port if register zero = 1. CON-
TROL returns to the main program a if successful and a
1 otherwise.
3. STATUS
Routine which verifies that GATEMAN or CONTROL were suc-
cessful in setting the state of a particular port. STATUS





Routine which uses the node and port ID's passed to it
in registers one and three, and the status word passed in
register zero to update a particular entry in the PORT
STATUS TABLE.
5. ENDFIND
Routine which searches the CONNECTION TABLE for the node
and port, whose ID's are passed in registers one and three,
for the termination of the link, whose starting point is
indicated by the given ID's. If successful, ENDFIND returns
to the main program the ENDPOINT ID's in registers one
and three, otherwise ENDFIND restores registers one and
three with the original ID's.
6. NULLFIND
Routine which searches the PORT STATUS TABLE for an avail-
able NULL port from which a possible new link can be ori-
ginated. NULLFIND is subject to two constraints. If called
during GROW, the NULL port ID returned must be from a
possible link whose temination node does not already have
an INBOARD port. If called during RECONFIGURE, the NULL
port ID returned must be on a node which does already have
an INBOARD port
. These two seemingly conflicting state-
ments will be made more clear in the next subsection.
To conclude the preparatory remarks, Table 3 displays the






























The GROW routine establishes the initial state of the I/O
network by attempting to activate a path to every node. The principle
input to the GROW routine is the CONNECTION TABLE and the principle
output
,
besides the physical setting of the network circuit switches,
is the PORT STATUS TABLE. Prior error and status information is not re-
quired for the GROW routine, for it will circumvent any failed
links or nodes as it unsuccessfully attempts to transmit GATEMAN or
CONTROL commands to the faulty elements.
Upon initiation, GROW records the system time for data taking
purposes, and initializes all tables and variables. It then sets the
central processing element as the root and initial "GROW-NODE" for
the growth process. The node and port ID from which a link is to be
growr is called the "GROW-POINT". The first GROW-POINT- to be considered
on any node is always port 1. Therefore, the CPC ' s port 1 is desig-
nated as the initial GROW-POINT. Next, ENDFIND is called to determine
if the GROW-POINT has a valid termination or "END-POINT". Since it
does, a GATEMAN command is sent to the END-POINT to make it an INBOARD
port. If GATEMAN is successful, the ID of the END-NODE is placed on
the "first-in-first-out" (FIFO) GROWLIST. This node will be the next
GROW-NODE to be considered. The value of the node counter "NODENUM"
is also incremented at this point. At the completion of the GROW rou-
tine, this counter will be compared to the actual number of physi-
cal nodes in the network. In this way a rapid determination can be made
as to the overall connectivity of the network.
Since a link has now been constructed, the current GROW-POINT
is exhausted. Consequently, NULLFIND is called to determine the next
GROW-POINT, if any, on the current GROW-NODE. In the case of the CPC,
two GROW-POINTS are possible and so the CPC ' s port 2 becomes the next
GROW-POINT. The linking process is now repeated and, if successful,
a second node is placed on the GROWLIST and NODENUM is again incre-




Proceeding ahead, the current GROW-NODE is again checked by
NULLFIND for the next available NULL port. Since none exist, the next
GROW-NODE is fetched from the GROWLIST and the GROWLIST pointer is
incremented. The linking process is now repeated for node 1, port 1,
identically to that used for node (the CPC) with one exception.
Before a link can be grown from a GROW-POINT the actual circuit switch
must be made OUTBOARD using a network CONTROL command. Also, as
explained for the NULLFIND subroutine, a link will not be grown to a
node which already has an INBOARD port. By applying the procedures
outlined so far to node 1, the following is the network status at the






From this point, the operation of the GROW program proceeds
rapidly to connect nodes 5 and 6. Again, all nodes who accept an
INBOARD port are placed on the GROWLIST, and must be utilized as a
valid GROW-NODE. When a value of is read as the GROW-NODE, the




To complete the process a check is made to see if N0DENUM=6.
If so, all six nodes have been made a part of the network. The GROW
program also records the terminal time and computes the elapsed time
for the growth process before retiring. (For a detailed description of
the GROW algorithm see Figure 3.7).
Although an extensive study of GROW-TIMES under various initial
conditions is presented in Chapter 6, three examples are displayed in
Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10. Notice the variations in the three configu-
rations' GROW-TIMES. The variations are due primarily to differences
in total I/O time required in these three examples. Again, this will
be amplified in Chapter 6. As a final comment, GROW is also called
periodically, by other routines such as TEST or SYSPROG,to re-GROW the
network. In this way contact can be re-established to nodes which may
have become operational again after previously being isolated from the
network during the fault detection process.
3.5.2 RECONFIGURE
The RECONFIGURE routine is a derivative of the GROW routine. It
is passed by TEST, the node and port ID of the END-POINT from which no
STATUS request response was received. RECONFIGURE begins by marking
both ends of this link FAILED in the PORT STATUS TABLE . The PORT
STATUS TABLE and GROWLIST up to this point are in the same state as
when the GROW routine had finished some time previously. RECONFIGURE
must now RESET the PORT STATUS TABLE to reflect that a portion of the
network previously connected has been isolated, when the faulty link
ceased to function. Once the PORT STATUS TABLE has been RESET,
RECONFIGURE simply sets its GROW-NODE pointer to the first node on the
GROWLIST and then branches to the GROW Routine to proceed as in a
partially completed network. The RESET process, however, is not a
straightforward procedure as can be quickly seen by the flowchart of
the RECONFIGURE routine (Figure 3.11).
The difficulty of RESETTING the PORT STATUS TABLE can be
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Figure 3.7 Flowchart of the GROW Routine
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Figure 3.8 Results of GROW for a Typical Six-Node Network,
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Figure 3.9 Results of GROW for Six-Node
Network with One Node Failure.
Figure 3.10 Results of GROW for Six-Node










Links CPC-4, and 1-2 have failed and links 2-3, 2-5, and 4-5 are
spares
.
2. RECONFIGURE the network given that:
Link 3-6 has failed.
3. Solution:
It can be seen quickly that nodes 4,5, and 6 have been left
dangling by the given link failure. In response to the failure, link
3-6 is marked FAILED, and RESET then proceeds to modify the PORT STATUS
TABLE and the GROWLIST in the following manner: (again refer to
Figure 3 . 11)
.
a. Since the FAILED-NODE , node 6, has 2 OUTBOARD ports, a
trace must be made of each "branch" to find its terminal
point. Once a termination has been found all entries for
the terminal node must be nulled in the PORT STATUS TABLE
and the terminal node's ID removed from the GROWLIST. (This
is the essence of the RESET process.)
b. Next, the trace is "unwound" back towards the FAILED-NODE,
repeating the expulsion process for each node in the path.
c. When the FAILED-NODE is again reached, a trace is made of
the other OUTBOARD port. Similar initializing procedures
are carried out for the nodes in its path also.
d. Note, difficulties arise when a node in the trace has more
than one OUTBOARD port resulting in multiple terminations.
RESET handles this condition easily through the use of a
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implements a FIFO scheme similar to the GROWLIST to
effectively handle all the nodes in the network to be NULLed.
Once the original FAILED-NODE is completely RESET (both
traces complete and the RESET LIST is empty) , the
RECONFIGURE program branches to an entry point in the GROW
routine
.
A summary of the steps outlined above for the example
presented is as follows:
(1) LINK 3-6 HAS FAILED GROWLIST
(2) NETWORK STATUS AFTER THE RESET OF








(3) NETWORK STATUS AFTER THE RESET OF NODE 6,
PORT 3 (results of Trace 2) , (also status






(4) STATUS OF FINAL RECONFIGURED NETWORK










Notice that in the above example, that only those links that
were essential to the RECONFIGURE process were activated.
Also, note that the GROWLIST has been restructured so that
it again reflects the order in which the nodes joined the
network.
As a means of comparison, RECONFIGURE was initially imple-
mented similar to an algorithm found in [25] that was used
in the earlier Draper Fault-Tolerant Network Effort.
Initial results have demonstrated that the utilization of
the RESET concept have resulted in an approximately 40%
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savings in RECONFIGURATION-TIME. This fact is further
demonstrated by the series of DECSCOPE photographs, Figures
3.13 through 3.14. in this example, the correction of a link
failure by RECONFIGURE was four times faster than that
obtained by RE-GROWING the network. This startling result
demonstrates the value of the RECONFIGURE routine, and it
emphasizes that minimizing the number of links that have < to
be de-activated re-activated, lessens the time lost by an
application process such as the digital autopilot, during the
RECONFIGURATION task.
3.5.3 TEST
The TEST routine is the fault detection and isolation program for
the single level network. (A flowchart of its algorithm is given in
Figure 3.12). TEST'S relatively short length is indicative of the fact
that it is a straightforward program that attempts to verify that
communications exist between the CPC and every node of the network. It
facilitates this by transmitting a STATUS request to each node whose
ID is on the GROWLIST, in the order in which that node was added to the
network. This is a crucial point, for it allows the non-receipt of a
single STATUS request to pinpoint a FAILED link down to one possible
choice. This is a valid procedure since the links were added to the
network in much the same way that a tree grows. Verifying that all the
n-1 links are good, which were added up to the point where the nth link
is tested, says that if the test fails for the nth link, it must be that
link which has malfunctioned. Therefore the order of the node ID's on
the GROWLIST must correspond exactly to the sequence in which the net-
work was GROWN or RECONFIGURED. TEST also performs a verification
function. By comparing the STATUS received from tiie TEST-NODE with the
entries in the more reliable "virtual" network of the PORT STATUS
TABLE, discrepancies can be detected and corrected. Since the PORT
STATUS TABLE is deemed correct, a discrepancy is treated like a link or
node failure, and results in the RECONFIGURE routine being called. The
TEST program runs either in the demonstration MONITOR mode or by the
normal process of being invoked as a task when error recovery procedures
have not been successful (see Section 3.6) . TEST in this case, detects
















Figure 3.12 Flowchart of the TEST Routine
67








* * * *




* * * *
>CARDS<U******** 1 *





* i|ji|tii(i^)it y*!m «
F * * * * ft
H-H-HH-I-* 2> »>»«»»»»0» 5 »»»«»»»
* * * *
ttfr ftfr tttty
* •«•»«»»»•«»•»»«»*•««»*(»«««,»«»»«««««««»(••<•»»•«<<»>•<••
Link 1-2 Failure Detected by TEST and Network
Repaired by RECONFIGURE.
Link 1-2 Failure Repaired by RE-GROW.





This interactive program, stored in the PROM of the ground sup-
port processor, is designed to be a demonstration and data collection
tool for use with the single level and eventually with the bilevel net-
work. It does not interfere with the operation of programs execu-
ting in the multiprocessor triads. It can, however, load from the main
memory the same GROW, RECONFIGURE, and TEST programs into the cache
memory of the ground support processor for debugging purposes. The
following DECSCOPE commands are available to the operator desiring
to utilize SYSPROG:
1. INIT
This command clears the DECSCOPE network display, initial-
izes all variables, tables, and constants used by SYSPROG.
INIT places SYSPROG into the command interpretation state
awaiting the next instruction.
2. GROW
This command causes a branch to the GROW routine which has
been loaded into the ground support processor's cache memory.
GROW also displays the results of the GROW routine on the
DECSCOPE.
3. MONITOR
This command places the network control into a test loop a-
waiting a link or node failure to be detected by the TEST
routine. When TEST detects a fault; control automatically is
passed to the RECONFIGURE routine for correction. Upon com-
pletion, the results of reconfiguration are displayed and
the test loop is once again entered.
4. SEND/GET
These two complementary commands are used to send and re-
ceive teletype messages via the DECSCPOE command line. The
destination node at which the teletype interface is atta-
ched must be specified prior to the actual message trans-
mission.




These commands control the speed at which the GROW
routine's results are displayed. FASTER displays the net-
work status only after the GROW routine has been com-
pleted, while SLOWER displays each link as it is acti-
vated.
b. LOOPS
This command specifies the number of test loops desired
during a MONITOR operation before the network is RE-
GROWN. LOOPS allows the network to become more or less
sensitive to transient faults, by being able to vary the
rate at which a previously failed link may re-join the
network subsequent to the link becoming operational again,
c. DELAY
This command allows a variable number of loops in the
frequently called DELAY subroutine. The most significant
use of this feature is in GATEMAN subroutine where an
important amount of delay is placed between the trans-
mission of a RESET and GATEMAN command. This amount of
delay must be variable to provide for efficient net-
work operation, since the time required to process net-




These three commands allow branching to any address in the
ground support processor. In the case of FDIR and STATUS,
control is passed to the entry points of the other two
system statu;; display programs, while GOTO allows an ar-
bitrary branch to the address which is appended to it
when it is typed on the command line.
3 . 6 Incorporation of the Network Configuration and Control Software
into the CARDS Multiprocessor
One of the most important benefits of the OSIRIS hierarchical
network structure, as has been cited several times, is that the recon-
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figuration and control algorithms are executed normally in the triply
redundant, fault-tolerant environment of the CARDS multiprocessor .With
this feature in mind, the configuration and control programs were inte-
grated into the overall OSIRIS system in the following manner:
1. They are invoked by the system I/O routines when error
recovery procedures are unsuccessful.
2. They are invoked on a periodic basis by a system task designed
to detect latent faults in portions of the network not cur-
rently involved in I/O.
Since the GROW, RECONFIGURE, and TEST routines were origi-
nally executed in the ground support processor for debugging purposes,
several modifications were required to adapt them so that they could
be run as a task in a triad of processors. The following lists the more
important of these changes:
1. The three programs were separated from the associated test
code and assembled together in the format required of a system
task. Since the total length of the network control programs
was slightly less than the 768 words alloted in a processor
cache memory for a task and its software stack, only one task
was created. This task was given a unique ID and the name
DETECT/RECONFIGURE task.
2. The DETECT/RECONFIGURE task was stored in an assigned address
space in main memory which was not used by any other task. A
pointer to its entry point was placed in the Task Identifi-
cation Table located in the base page of main memory.
3. All references to the display portion of SYSPROG still re-
maining in the DETECT/RECONFIGURE task were removed. There can
be no transfer of control outside the triad while it is running,
4. The task was made fully relocatable by removing all refer-
ences to specific memory locations and by using indexed ad-
dressing wherever appropriate.
5. All constants used by the task were placed in the base page
of the processor's cache memory. However, upon initiation,
these constants required initialization which was accomplished
by reading into the base page a block of code containing the
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values of the constants. This procedure, while time consum-
ing, was necessary since each task invoked into a processor
uses the base page for its own variables and constants and
consequently does not preserve the data there from a previous
task.
6. Finally, all system variables used both by SYSPROG and the
DETECT/RECONFIGURE task were placed in main memory, a shared
resource. In this way interaction between the task and the
control program was facilitated. Specifically, configuration
speeds, and the number of test loops desired before RE-GROW,
could still be controlled by the operator at the DECSCOPE,
in spite of the configuration and control algorithms being
executed in a multiprocessing environment.
Even when all of the above procedures are carried out properly,
DETECT/RECONFIGURE will not be executed as a task unless it is added to
the Time Event Queue of the multiprocessor. The Time Event Queue is the
scheduler for the various system tasks. It controls the order of exe-
cution, execution times, iteration rates, triad assignments, and exe-
cution restrictions, if any. The queue, as diagrammed in Figure 3.15,
joins the set of tasks using a series of chained address pointers.
Since the TEST routine requires approximately 70 msec, for a
typical six-node network, an iteration rate of 1 Hertz was chosen for
the network task. In this way, the network will be scanned for latent
faults once every second. If a fault is detected, RECONFIGURE will be
branched to for correction before the task retires. Further, if the
required number of test loops, as specified by LOOPS, have been made
on the previous number of task iterations, then the GROW program will be
called for RE-GROWTH of the network. Again, once this is complete the
task will retire. In all three possible variations of the DETECT/
RECONFIGURE task the total time that normal system traffic will
be suspended, has been shown to be of the order of one second (refer
to Chapter 6) . While this amounts to an excessive portion of the avail-
able I/O bandwidth for an iteration rate of 1 Hertz, the one second
figureis more of an upper bound for infrequent occurrences. In a nor-
mal situation, no faults would be detected and so DETECT/RECONFIGURE
would retire in the acceptable time of 100 msec.
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The Time Event Queue
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Pointer to TASK B
Pointer to WAITING AREA
TASK ID
Pointer to Arguments
High Order Time (15 bits)
Figure 3.15 Relation of a Typical




THE BILEVEL TEN-NODE NETWORK
4.1 General Description and Capabilities
The development of the bilevel network as an improvement to the
single level network of Chapter III was undertaken primarily to further
enhance the benefits that networking can provide to the area of distri-
buted processing. The variety and often extensive number of sensors
and effectors found in a typical flight control environment impose se-
vere bandwidth and reaction time requirements on the central processing
center (CPC)
.
If this processing load can be distributed to a set of
local processors, preferably co-located with the individual sensors or
effectors, a great savings in bandwidth is realized [16] . Though this
forms the basic justification for the single level network, as previous-
ly described, the bilevel network goes one step futher by improving the
throughput of the local processors. It does this by implementing a
network with two hierarchical levels, the upper level emphasizing
control and data transfer, and the lower level emphasizing computation
and data reduction.
The concept of a bilevel network is not new. D.W. Davies and
his co-workers at the British National Physical Laboratory proposed a
similar idea for use in a telecommunications environment [6]. They
envisioned a two level network in which the upper level would be respon-
sible for long distance packet transmission and switching functions,
while the lower level would be a local area network serving a central
phone exchange, for example. This organizing of similar processing
functions into sub-networks carries over into the OSIRIS bilevel net-
work concept. Here, the upper level network can be considered as a
group of "middle manager" nodes. Each middle manager node is responsi-
ble to the CPC only, but can have subordinate to it one or more nodes
forming a lower level network (see Figure 4.1). Since the middle mana-
ger node is a member of both hierarchical levels simultaneously, it







U = Upper Level Node
L = Lower Level Node
Figure 4.1 The Bilevel Network Concept,
76

example, each lower level network, ideally, is comprised of nodes whose
attached host processors all perform a related function such as
navigation
.
The real benefit of the bilevel network over the simplex network,
as has been stated earlier, is that it improves the computation through-
put possible at a lower level processor node. It does this by not inter-
rupting every lower level node every time a request for data is origi-
nated by the CPC. In the normal single level network each message sent
by the CPC generates an IRQ interrupt in every node, which must be
processed to determine if action is required. Thus, any background
processing being done at a node is continually being suspended while the
operating system determines the nature of the received message. In the
bilevel network; however, only the upper level of the network is inter-
rogated directly by the CPC. Each bilevel node has the ability to
intercept and re-transmit all messages designated for any of the nodes
of its sub-net. Only when such a message is received, is the lower
level interrupted for data. In this way, the lower level network be-
comes a more efficient computer and spends less of its time processing
data requests not intended for its use. This then is a basic justifi-
cation for the bilevel network concept. As an alternative, another
solution to the constant interrupt problem, investigated in Ref. 31, has
been to implement a node with two microprocessors, 6ne dedicated to
background processing and one designed to handle to the communications
and control functions exclusively. In this way, each dual processor
node can simultaneously handle both primary nodal functions.
The experimental bilevel network at the C.S. Draper Laboratory,
has the following characteristics and capabilities in addition to those
listed for the single level network in Section 3.1.
1. Network Size and Composition - ten nodes, two of which can be
bilevel. The increased network size adds to the richness of
various topologies possible, while the implementation of just
two bilevel nodes can clearly demonstrate the bilevel concept.
2. Memory Capacity - an additional Ik of RAM and 2.5k of PROM
for each bilevel node.
3. Input/Output Ports - 3 additional for each bilevel node for
a total of six.
4. Internal Switching Functions - an additional PIA has been




5. Communication method - circuit-switching, as before - inter-
nal to each network level; packet-switching of 1 byte packets
at each bilevel node.
6. Number of sub-networks possible from any bilevel node -
one, due to the restrictions placed on the ability of the
software operating system to handle the processing of bilevel
interface ports. Currently, only one interface port can be
serviced for a given bilevel node.
1
•
Software additions - expansion of the nodal operating system
to handle the bilevel control command, and additional buffer
handling routines to implement the packet-switching communi-
cations scheme.
4 . 2 Test Network Topology Selection
The topology chosen for the bilevel network was basically the
six node topology selected earlier with four additional nodes,
(see Figure 4.2). Since no actual partitioning according to node pro-
cessing functions was made, it was decided to use a topology which
would best demonstrate the bilevel network concept. That is, each bi-
level node was provided with up to four nearest neighbors which could
function as members of a lower level network. In addition, two links
were added joining the two sub-nets. These were implemented so that
nodes could be exchanged between the sub-nets in the event of link or
node failures. As in the single-level network, three of the nodes were
placed in the Hybrid Simulation Facility near the aircraft flight simu-
lator. The other seven nodes were located together in Advanced Digital
Systems Laboratory near the Central Processing Center (refer to Figure
3.1 again). Finally, a DECSCOPE display routine was also written
showing the ten node network in a symmetric arrangement, much like
Figure 4.2, in order to facilitate the display of network status. Now
that the basic characteristics of the bilevel topology have been out-
lined, the modifications to the existing single level software and
hardware, required for the bilevel network, will be discussed.
4 . 3 Nodal Hardware Description
The additional hardware required to implement a bilevel node
is located on a bilevel interface board. This board together with
the previously described M6800 microprocessor node board, constitute
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Figure 4.2 Bilevel Ten-Node Network Topology.
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the complete bilevel node. The bilevel interface board is much simpler
in design than the M6800 microprocessor node board. It is comprised,
basically, of the additional memory required by the bilevel operating
system, and the additional hardware required for the three extra I/O
ports. Specifically, to add the three ports, one peripheral interface
adapter (PIA) was necessary to supply the required six enabling signals.
In addition, three asynchronous communication interface adapters, and
a similar number of optical isolators, and differential line drivers
were provided. Finally, the requisite number of gates and tri-state buf-
fers were included to affect the same internal switching circuitry as
in Figure 3.4. To add the increased memory, the following number of
memory elements were appended to the node's data and address buses
1. 5 - MM5204Q 512 x 3 bit National Semiconductor Programmable
Read Only Memories
2. 8 - MM2102 Ik x 1 bit National Semiconductor Random Access
Memories
.
The actual separation in the bilevel node of the two hierarchi-
cal network levels was accomplished via software, through a new CONTROL
command specifically designed for the bilevel node. The specifics of
this new feature along with other additions to the node's operating
system will be covered next. It should be emphasized, in summary, that
the basic differences hetween a single and bilevel node are primarily
operating system related. The differences in hardware, on the other
hand, effect the capacity of the node to execute application programs,
and the number of I/O ports which it possesses. In other words, a
single level node could be converted into a scaled down version of a
bilevel node simply by loading the bilevel operating system with a few
minor alterations.
4 . 4 Nodal Operating System
The bilevel operating system contains all of the features of
the single level operating system as outlined in Section 3.4. In addi-
tion it contains the following new capabilities [28]
:
1. It provides another control command, the BILEVEL RECONFIGU-
RATION command. This feature has been added to the network
control section of the operating system. The BILEVEL RE-
CONFIGURATION command is used to take a desired ACIA off the
node's internal bus, thereby removing that port from the net-
work of which it was a member. It then enables the port for
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use as a bilevel interface port to a subordinate network.
2. It utilizes twelve pointers, instead of six as in the single
level o/S to determine which process to activate upon re-
ceipt of an IRQ interrupt. This is necessary since any one
of the six I/O ports may be sending or receiving data at the
instant an IRQ interrupt is processed.
3. It implements four 200 word contiguous circular buffers in
RAM. One pair of buffers handles CPC - bilevel node com-
munications while the other two buffers facilitate communi-
cation between the bilevel node and its subordinate network.
4. As part of the applications programs interface, it adds the
following buffer management routines:
a. GET - takes data received from the CPC which is in the
"CPC to node" INPUT buffer and passes it to the applica-
tion program.
b. PUT - places data to be transmitted back to the CPC from
the application program into the "bilevel to CPC" OUTPUT
buffer.
c. BGET - takes data received from the sub-network, which
in the "sub-net to bilevel" INPUT buffer, and passes it
to the application program.
d. BPUT - place data to be transmitted to the sub-network
from the application program in the "bilevel to sub-net"
OUTPUT buffer.
5. Finally, the bilevel operating system also has two new I/O
routines for transmitting and receiving data from the sub-
ordinate network. These routines are part of the applica-
tion programs interface, and are called READ and WRITE.
Overall, the modifications required to implement the bilevel
operating system are concentrated in the area of providing the bilevel
node with sufficient data handling capabilities to function as a "pseudo
CPC". In other words, the bilevel node must be given the ability to
efficiently interpret, reformat, and forward the one byte packets of
data to the lower level network. It must also, be able to reverse
the procedure, and receive messages from the lower level nodes. To




4.5 Network Configuration and Control Software
The modification of the GROW, RECONFIGURE, and TEST programs to
operate efficiently in a bilevel network present several problems to be
overcome. The following are the significant areas of difficulty:
1. Since the bilevel network utilizes groupings of nodes pos-
sessing similar processing functions, it is desirable that
these nodes always be configured together in the same sub-
network. This means that a generalized GROW routine is no
longer applicable, since it places little preference as to
which nodes are connected together (see Figure 4.3). What
is required is a more specific GROW routine which attempts
to preserve the apriori composition of each sub-net.
2. Similar to problem (1), RECONFIGURE must attempt to repair
a network fault by first utilizing the spare links of a
given sub-network. If reconfiguration of the sub-network
does not result in the isolated portion being reconnected,
then an effort must be made to transfer these isolated nodes
to another sub-network, or to the upper level. In any net-
work it is more important to maintain the survivability of
every node, than it is to insist that the integrity of a
particular sub-network be preserved.
3. Even though the TEST routine requires the least modification
to operate in a bilevel environment, a problem does arise
when determining the order of nodes to be tested. If some
sort of procedure is not used to place successive nodes on
the GROWLIST, then the failure to receive a STATUS request
response from a given test node will not isolate the fault
to a single point. In this case, a generalized GROW routine
must be used to place the nodes on the GROWLIST. Unfortu-
nately, this seems to be a contradiction of problem (1).
In order to satisfy the above three problems, a compromise has
been implemented in adapting the GROW routine, specifically, to the bi-
level network. The essential features of this compromise are described
as follows:
1. Before executing the GROW routine a value from 1 to 4 is
placed in main memory locations SUBNET1 and SUBNET2 . These
values signify the number of nodes desired in each sub-net-












Figure 4.3 Example Where a General GROW
Routine is No Longer Applicable.

SUBNET2 is bilevel node 5's sub-net. In this way the normal
GROW routine will attempt to connect to node 3 and node 5 the
specified number of nodes (see Figure 4.4). If the nearest
neighbors of the two bilevel nodes can be considered as
nodes whose hosts have similar processing functions, then
as desired in problem (1), a partitioning based on similar
processing functions, can be accomplished. It must also be
noted; however, that GROW must be modified to recognize that
if nodes 3 or 5 are acting as bilevel nodes, then they can
have at most one bilevel port. Again, this is due to the
limitations of the bilevel operating system.
As the network is grown, each node which is configured as a
lower level node will have a 3 or a 5 appended to its GROW-
LIST entry in the following manner:
0000 ^OXXX 000X XXXX "\
sixteen bit GROWLIST entry






This addition will allow RECONFIGURE to attempt to repair
the network using the nodes of a particular sub-net first,
thus satisfying the initial part of problem (2) . The second
half of the problem satisfies itself once the members of the
sub-net have been exhausted as possible GROW nodes. In other
words, RECONFIGURE requires only minimal modification (see
Figure 4.5).
3. Finally, since the basic GROW routine has not been altered,
it will still place nodes on the GROWLIST in a logical order
therefore, TEST will continue to isolate a fault in the net-
work in one operation. Consequently, problem 3 has been
solved with no modification required.
Since the changes and additions required to implement the three
configuration and control programs are relatively minor no revisions to
the flowcharts of Figures 3.7, 3.11, or 3.12 will be presented. Also,
since the roles of SYSPROG and the DETECT/RECONFIGURE task are identi-
cal in the bilevel environment, their functions will not be repeated
here. In summary, the configuration and control software adapt them-
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5.1 Definition of Reliability in the Context of the
OSIRIS I/O Environment
In the context of the OSIRIS system, the chief role of the I/O
network is to provide a reliable, uninterrupted communications path
between the central processing center and each flight critical sensor
or effector throughout the duration of any mission. If a particular
critical device becomes isolated from the CPC due to a combination of
node or link failures, then the survivability of the entire system is
jeopardized. Consequently, the measure of reliability to be used for
the OSIRIS Input/Output Network is the probability that the network will
maintain effective communications with every flight critical subsystem
throughout the length of time that the system is in operation. To aid
in the further clarification of this concept, the following assumptions
will be made concerning the network's general organization:
1. All nodes in the network will have three I/O ports (i.e. -
there will be no bilevel nodes in the reliability analysis)
.
2. All flight critical sensors (gyros, accelerometers , etc.)
will be implemented in groups of at least three, if not more,
to provide an adequate backup capability (see Figure 5.1 for
one possible configuration of sensors and nodes)
.
3. All effectors (rudder , ailerons, etc.) will be implemented
in pairs, with each individual effector being serviced by a
triply redundant triad of nodes (see Figure 5.2 for one
possible configuration of effectors and nodes)
.
Before the specific problem of analyzing the reliability of a
typical OSIRIS network is addressed, the general form of the reliability
function, R(t) , will be presented. For the general class of network
applications
:
R^F ( t) = n [Reliabilities of all possible configurations













Figure 5.1 Example Sensor Configuration,









Figure 5.2 Example Effector Configuration,
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To evaluate this expression numerically, the entire set of applicable
combinations must be determined. However, problems quickly arise in
this procedure due to the determination of the following, often
complexly interrelated, factors.
1. The failure rates of the individual links, nodes, and
attached host devices.
2. The failure rates of the various configurations of sensors
and effectors
.
3. The interdependencies of the sensor and effector combina-
tions (i.e. - if a sensor group fails, will an effector
triad fail also?)
4. The variations in failure rates for active and spare links
or nodes.
5. Considerations of transient and intermittent, as well as
permanent faults.
6. The effects of dynamic reconfiguration to correct system
faults
.
7. The effects of imperfect fault detection, and hence latent
faults
One quickly realizes, upon examining this list, that the final
form of the reliability function for such a network involves an
extremely complicated overall solution. Unless major assumptions are
made prior to the analysis, this avenue can result in reliability
functions which have little or no practical value [8] . The approach
used in this thesis, consequently, will be to address the relative
contributions to the overall reliability function that the following




5 . 2 Reliability Considerations in a Typical OSIRIS Network
In a typical OSIRIS I/O Network, many of the same factors that
effected the reliability function of the general network application,
apply here also. The critical issues involved in the OSIRIS approach
91

to the reliability problem are as follows:
1. Which are the flight critical sensors and effectors?
2. How much redundancy is required to insure their
survivability?
3. How are the sensors and effectors interrelated?
4. What is the overall system failure rate which the
network must be able to achieve?
Once the initial analysis concerning dependencies, flight
critical functions, and choices for redundant structures has been
completed, the reliability evaluation can proceed based on the mathe-
matical equations governing reliability theory. Useful expressions at
this point will include:
1
•




(t) = exp (- X. t)




The reliability function for a TMR ( two-out-of-three) voting
system, as would be implemented in the effector triads
excluding the voter reliability) [3] :
RTMR (t)
= [R.(t)] 3 + 3 [R
±
(t)] 2 (1 - R
i
(t))
here the (R.(t) 's are the equal node reliabilities in the
triad.
3. The reliability function for three parallel systems all
performing the same function, as would be implemented in




(t)] - 3 [R
i
(t)] 2 + [R
i
(t)] 3
where R.(t)'s are the individual node reliabilities.
4. Approximation to the individual component reliability
function when the failure rate X.t < .01:





Now, using a computer simulation or other computational aids, the
final value for the reliability function could be determined. At this
point, it has been assumed that all individual failure rates that have
been provided from user data, or experimental investigations, are
accurate. For a commercial aircraft environment, the required failure
rate that should be obtained is on the order of 10~ 9 failures/hour.
This converts, using reliability expression (4) , to a desired system
reliability of .999999999. If the final computed network reliability
is not relatively close to this value then additional redundancy is
required. [3] Though not yet shown, a solution to this problem may be
to provide more alternate communication paths, if the probability of
link failure is high (i.e. a combatant aircraft environment). More
parallelism is another alternative, if system cost is not too critical,
and the individual node or device failure rates are high. Multiple
other solutions can also be investigated. After each improvement, how-
ever, the reliability function should be recomputed to determine if the
given constraints have been met.
In summary, though the preceding discussion is relatively
qualitative in nature, it does address the realistic problem of
attempting to accurately model, and then compute the complex relia-
bility expression for a typical OSIRIS I/O network.
5 . 3 Reliability Improvement Provided by the Alternate Paths
in the Demonstration Six-Node Network
Since the demonstration I/O network developed is unique in its
use of dynamic reconfiguration to correct and circumvent network faults,
this quality merits investigation in the context of reliability. When
compared to the typical OSIRIS network of the previous section it can
be seen that few of the same reliability considerations apply to the
single or bilevel networks. There is no distribution of sensors and
effectors to contend with, since all simulated flight data is arriving
or being transmitted over one or two nodes. There are no variations in
link or node failure rates since all links and nodes are equivalent.
Still, the general reliability expression has an application to the
experimental configuration. For the single level network, the relia-
bility function R„__(t) is defined as:1 NET
R (t) = II [Reliabilities of all the possible paths connect-
ing the CPC to each node in the network.]
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In other words, the network "survives" only if it is fully con-
nected, and will perish if one or more of the six network nodes cannot
be reached by RECONFIGURE
.
From this definition, it is evident that the reliability function
of the single level network is contingent upon the following two factors
1. It is directly proportional to the individual node's relia-
bility function, since there is no nodal redundancy.
Specifically:
^ODE " SXP ( " *N fc)
where \ is a constant node failure rate.
b. If * t is assumed to be < .01 then:
^ODE = (1 -V>
c. Therefore:
^ET = (1 -V } "
It is directly proportional to the reliability function of
three links in parallel, since three links, not including the
two CPC links, must fail before a node is isolated. In this
case, for each individual CPC to node pair the link failures
are independent and equal. Specifically:
a
«
RLINK ° eXP ( " X L t}
where X is a constant link failure rate
.
Li






c. Now for 3 links in parallel (refer to Section 5.2):








d. This expression cannot be simply expanded to six nodes
because the link failures distributed over the network
are not disjoint. (i.e. - one link failure affects
more than one node - CPC pair (see Section 2.6 for
redundancy matrix representation) )
.
e. As a side note, if the 6 nodes were independent with
respect to link failures, the general reliability









Thus, an overall reliability expression for the single level net-
assuming that link and node failures are statistically indepen-





t) - 3(1 - X Lt)
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where C, and C_ are constants relating the relative magnitudes of A
and A .
Li
As a final point, if the reliability of a strictly dedicated
network with simplex links were compared to that of the network, the
advantages of redundant paths can be shown. Specifically:
-3











Dedicated conn ~~ (1 " V = -^ooo
TWORK
= 3(1 " V " 3(1 " ^^ + U " ^^^ .99999999
In conclusion, the providing of alternate communication paths is a
definite benefit to the overall system reliability, especially in





6 .1 Key Factors Affecting Network Performance
The evaluation of the performance of the single level and
bilevel networks is an important topic. Only if the various
configuration and control algorithms can be executed rapidly
enough, so as not to interfere with the normal network traffic,
will they be acceptable. Furthermore, in the bilevel network the
delay inherent in the packet- switching communications scheme must
also be considered. Unfortunately, it must be stated at this
point, that performance data is available for only the single level
network. Due to unforeseen delays in the implementation of the
additional four nodes and associated links, the bilevel network was
not completed in time to be evaluated in this thesis.
For the single level network, consequently, three execution times




The time required for the GROW routine to configure a
network not based on previous status. Since the GROW
routine always tries to configure a six-node network due
to the test topology it is given, the GROW-TIME is not
simply proportional to the number of nodes in the network.
2. RECONFIGURE- TIME
The time required to reconfigure a network based on the
status given in the PORT STATUS TABLE. The RECONFIGURE
-
TIME begins the instant that the TEST routine passes to the
RECONFIGURE routine the ID of the failed END-POINT. The
RECONFIGURE-TIME is a function of the extent to which the




The time required by the TEST program to send a STATUS
request to every node on the GROWLIST and interpret its
response. As long as no faults are detected, the TEST-TIMES
calculated after each test loop, for given number of nodes
in the network, are relatively constant. The only source of
variance is the periodic but variable number of six
millisecond interruptions occurring in the TEST program
execution in order to update the panel displays on the CARDS
multiprocessor
.
In the next two sections the following questions, which are
indicative of the performance characteristics of the control and
configuration algorithms, will be answered:
1. GROW-TIME
How does the configuration time depend on the number of nodes
in the network or on the amount of total I/O time involved
in a particular configuration? What are the areas in which




How does the RECONFIGURE-TIME compare to the GROW-TIME for a
similar network repair? Is it always more advantageous to
RECONFIGURE rather than re-GROW?
3. TEST-TIME
Does the TEST-TIME vary with the number of nodes in the
network? Is it short enough to be calculated once every
second as part of the DETECT/RECONFIGURE task?
Before proceeding any further, two points must be noted at this
juncture concerning the execution times. First, all times quoted in
the following paragraphs are relative to the hardware and to the speed
of the I/O implemented in the demonstration network. No attempt will be
made to place absolute upper or lower bounds on the execution times
which are acceptable. In the actual OSIRIS system to be constructed,
these times will in all likelihood be at least an order of magnitude
faster than those calculated here. Secondly, the procedure of
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recording the initial and final event times and, as mentioned earlier,
the periodic interruptions of the panel display program induce a bias
level proportional to the length of the elapsed time. Again, in an
actual implementation, these artificialities would be removed.
6.2 GROW-TIME Evaluation
A comparison of the configuration times required for the growth
of single level networks of varying link and node numbers was performed.
The goal of this investigation was to determine which factors most
directly influence these elapsed GROW-TIMES. For the demonstration six-
node network, every possible six node combination was tested by
systematically failing different groups of nodes. Furthermore, every
data sample was actually the average value of three identical runs.
In all, over 300 samples were obtained.
The first comparison was made between the average GROW-TIME to
attempt to construct a six-node network given that from one up to five
of the six nodes have been removed. The results of this comparison as
can be seen in Table 4, do not exhibit any degree of linearity with the
varying final network sizes. Therefore, this cannot be a valid mea-
sure of GROW-TIME dependence. Also notice in Table 4, the extremely
large standard deviations exhibiting a wide spread of the data about
its mean.
The second comparison is much more productive. It displays the
dependence of the GROW-TIME on the number of CPC timeouts. A
timeout, as cited earlier, occurs in the CPC's I/O routines when it
does not receive status information back from a particular node.
Obviously, the more timeouts that are encountered, i.e., the more dead
ends that GROW is forced to take, the longer the configuration time.
Table 5 and Figure 6.2 support this observation. However, for the case
of no timeouts the configuration time is actually more than at three





AVERAGE GROW-TIME VERSUS NUMBER OF NODES
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Figure 6.1 Graph of Average GROW-TIME to




# of CPC TIMEOUTS
Figure 6.2 Graph of Average GROW-TIME to
Number of CPC Timeouts.
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As a final attempt, the data from Table 5 is now compared to the
total I/O time instead of the number of CPC timeouts. This measure
takes into account the time required for all STATUS, GATEMAN, and
CONTROL commands, in addition to the CPC timeouts. As can be seen in
Table 6 and Figure 6.3, this provides the best overall solution as to
which parameter the GROW-TIME is a function. Consequently, the time
required to grow a particular network can be reduced by streamlining
the network I/O procedures. Two solutions are proposed to do just
this. One solution has been tried and found successful, while the
second is currently being implemented. First, the delay value of
7F16 miHiseconds in the CPC timeout loop can be reduced. A reduction
of 20 ig, or, in other words, cutting the time waiting in a loop for a
response to return from a node, can save considerable time. Likewise,
a reduction in the length of the returning response from five words to
three words will also speed up the growth process.
In summary, even under the most adverse circumstances, a network
can be completely grown in less than half a second. This time is within
the requirements currently dictated by the demonstration autopilot
application program. Further, through streamlining of the I/O
procedures and the implementation of faster microprocessors, the
GROW-TIME required for a typical network of a fixed number of nodes,
will continue to decline. For larger networks, the size of the net
data base, and the total GROW-TIME for the new topologies will be
roughly proportional to the number of nodes. Again, the increased
speed of the I/O due to faster microprocessors, etc., will most likely
offset the increased configuration times, and keep the entire growth
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Figure 6.3 Graph of Average GROW-TIME to Total I/O Time
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6 . 3 RECONFIGURE-and TEST-TIME Evaluation
Two observations concerning the RECONFIGURE-and TEST-TIMES have
been made:
1. As stated in Section 3.5, the RECONFIGURE program is about
four times as fast as the GROW program in correcting typical
single network faults. This is attributable to the fact that
the RECONFIGURE routine does not disturb portions of the
network which are functioning properly while GROW reconstructs
the network by initially clearing any past status. Except
for faults near the root node of a network, RECONFIGURE will
always be faster than GROW due to its savings in total I/O
time. In fact RECONFIGURE should always be called to correct
a network fault, since it will degenerate into the GROW
routine if the fault is detected at the root node of the
network.
2. As for the TEST program, data has shown that the average
execution time required is roughly eleven milliseconds
for each node in the network. Consequently, an average
TEST time for a six-node network of sixty-six milliseconds
is possible. To this value, however, the panel interruption
variance must be appended to arrive at the observed cycle
time of 66 _ 6 milliseconds (refer to Figure 3.13) . In
addition to the preliminary Draper network effort, the TEST
time per node of eleven milliseconds, compares favorably
with the six milliseconds per node observed for the similar
functioning VERIFY routine [25]. In the case of VERIFY,
the nodes being interrogated were strictly hardware in
composition; and hence could respond more quickly than the
microprocessor nodes. As a final comment, a measure of the
total time the network will remain isolated due to a fault




Average time required to detect a fault and reconfigure
the network .
[Average delay time before the DETECT/RECONFIGURE
[task has been INVOKED.
i J Average TEST-TIME
node M # of nodes in network
I i Average RECONFIGURE-TIME
to repair a network
A summary of the important results of Chapter 6 is given in Table 7
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF THE IMPORTANT RESULTS OF THE
SINGLE AND BILEVEL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
1. Number of link failures which can be
tolerated and still maintain network 2
survivability, (except CPC links)
2. Range of Average GROW-TIMES for networks 139.8 to
of 1 to 6 nodes 356 . 1 msec
.
3. Average length of TEST loop/node to
determine if a fault has occurred
11 msec.
4. Mean time to DETECT a fault and
RECONFIGURE a six-node network
780 msec.
5. Most critical factor affecting the Total






TOPICS FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATIONS
Several areas related to the single and bilevel network de-
velopment should be pursued in future investigations. The more signi-
ficant of these topics are delineated below.
1. The bilevel network hardware should be completed and validity
of its operating system, and the configuration and control
algorithms verified.
2. Additional application programs to be run as background jobs
should be written for various nodes. These programs must be
executed both in a node which is a member of an upper level
network and one which is a member of a sub-network. In this
manner, quantitative results could be obtained for the
throughput gains possible through the utilization of a bi-
level network.
3. An evaluation will need to be made as to the relative merits
of the bilevel versus the single level network to determine
which I/O scheme will be chosen for implementation in the
actual OSIRIS system.
4. In reference to the NAVY contract under which the bilevel
network is being developed, an effort should be directed to-
wards an adaptation of the network design to a combatant
ship environment. In essence, a hypothetical cost and feasi-
bility study could be made for a network implementation a-
board a representative NAVY ship.
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5. Finally, looking towards the developing technology of fi-
ber optics, serious consideration should be placed upon
its possible application to the network. Its high bandwidth
potential, low loss characteristics, and exceptional toler-
ance to electromagnetic interference make the substitution of
fiber optic links for the current electrical transmission
method very attractive. Further, potential savings in weight






This thesis has traced the development of the six-node network
from its conception as a follow-on design to an earlier fault-tolerant
network [25], to its eventual implementation as an operational portion
of the demonstration OSIRIS system. It has also developed the bilevel
node concept as an added capability to the single level network, and
has traced a majority of its implementation. In both network designs
the overriding concern throughout has been the attainment of increased
levels of reliability and damage-tolerance, while maintaining the
maximum network throughput possible.
In comparison to the earlier Draper network effort of 1974 [25]
,
three statements must be made concerning the microprocessor-based
follow-on design:
1. The single and bilevel nodes require significantly less
hardware. Whereas 60 discrete chips were incorporated
into the original simplex node, a single microprocessor,
its associated memories, and related interface chips are
all that are needed now. In other words, due to advances in
technology, a node can be implemented on one plug-in cir-
cuit board instead of two.
2. The single and bilevel configuration and control programs
require approximately 10-15% more words of main memory.
This increased memory is utilized primarily to interface
the central processing center with the microprocessor node's
operating system. Since the increased flexibility afforded
by the microprocessor-based node design outweighs the
relatively few additional words of main memory required,
this statement is not a degrading feature of the follow-on
design.
3. Finally, due to the speed restrictions imposed by the hard-
ware currently in use, the single and bilevel network manage-
Ill

ment functions require a greater percentage of the available
I/O bandwidth. This percentage will be reduced considerably
when the I/O rate is increased by a factor of approximately
100 to 1 in the next OSIRIS implementation.
Additionally, the single and bilevel network designs offer specific
advantages when compared to the more conventional non-redundant bus and
dedicated connection I/O schemes. Among these advantages are four
specific points which have been stated or implied throughout this
thesis
:
1. The single and bilevel networks offer fault- and
damage-tolerance due to their dynamic reconfiguration
feature
.
2. The network designs lend themselves more toward distributing
the computing load of the system down to the local processor
nodes. This is attributable to the hierarchical network
architecture
.
3. Since reflection and attenuation problems are not a limiting
factor as in many bus designs, the single and bilevel net-
works are more adaptable to changing and expanding system
applications
4. Finally, the simplicity of the link interfaces in both net-
work designs provide considerable flexibility in the
decision as to which transmission method to implement in the
actual OSIRIS system. Furthermore, the point-to-point
nature of these links lend themselves to a fiber optic
link implementation.
In conclusion, the experimental single and bilevel input/output
networks developed at the C.S. Draper Laboratory have demonstrated
that dynamic reconfiguration in a hierarchical network can result in
significant improvements in reliability and fault-tolerance, when
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